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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over these 
consolidated cases pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(b) (1992 
8c Supp. 1194) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Was State Farm required to exhaust its administrative 
remedies before seeking judicial review of orders issued by the 
Director of the Utah Antidiscrimination Division ("UADD"). 
Because this is strictly an issue of law pertaining to subject 
matter jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals does not defer to the 
trial courts' rulings and reviews such rulings under a correction 
of error standard. Maverik Country Stores v. Industrial 
Commission, 860 P.2d 944 (Utah App. 1993); also see St. Benedict's 
Development Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 
1991) (standard of review on orders dismissing for failure to state 
a claim.) 
2. Did State Farm file its petitions for judicial review of 
the UADD Director's Orders within the time permitted by law. 
As with the previous issue, this is strictly an issue of law 
pertaining to subject matter jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals 
will therefore exercise plenary authority to determine whether 
subject matter jurisdiction exists. Silva v. Department of 
Employment Security, 786 P.2d 246, 247 (Utah App. 1990). 
APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following provisions of law are determinative to the 
issues raised in these appeals: 
Section 63-46b-14, Utah Administrative Procedures Act. 
Section 34-35-7.1, Utah Antidiscriminatory Act. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Industrial Commission accepts the statement of the case 
set forth in State Farm's brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act, the Utah 
Antidiscriminatory Act, and a prior decision of the Utah Court of 
Appeals require parties to exhaust their administrative remedies 
under the Utah Antidiscriminatory Act before seeking judicial 
review. Because State Farm failed to exhaust its administrative 
remedies in these cases, the district court properly dismissed 
State Farm's petitions for judicial review. 
State Farm's petitions for judicial review are also subject to 
dismissal because they were not filed within 3 0 days from the date 
of the UADD Director's Order, as required by the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act. 
2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
STATE FARM'S PETITIONS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW WERE PROPERLY 
DISMISSED BY THE DISTRICT COURT FOR LACK OF SUBJECT 
MATTER JURISDICTION, DUE TO STATE FARM'S FAILURE TO 
EXHAUST ITS ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES. 
State Farm argues it is free to "elect" whether or not to 
exhaust the administrative remedies provided under the Utah 
Antidiscriminatory Act, Utah Code Ann. §34-35-1 et seq. However, 
State Farm's argument is contradicted by the plain language of the 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act (U.A.P.A.), Utah Code Ann. §63-
46b-l et seq. and the Antidiscriminatory Act itself, as that act 
has been previously interpreted by the Court of Appeals. 
Section 63-46b-14(2) of the U.A.P.A. sets forth a general rule 
requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies, plus two 
exceptions to that general rule: 
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after 
exhausting all administrative remedies available, except 
that: 
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust 
administrative remedies if this chapter or any other 
statute states that exhaustion is not required; 
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial 
review of the requirement to exhaust any or all 
administrative remedies if: 
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or 
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in 
irreparable harm disproportionate to the public benefit 
derived from requiring exhaustion. 
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Thus, §63-46b-14(2) of the U.A.P.A. requires exhaustion of 
administrative remedies as a condition precedent to judicial 
review, except under the limited circumstances described in §63-
46b-14 (2) (a) and (b) . 
Subsection 63-46b-14(2)(b) of the U.A.P.A. excuses a party 
from exhausting its administrative remedies if irreparable harm 
would result, or if exhaustion of administrative purposes would 
serve no useful purpose. State Farm does not contend that either 
criteria is present in these cases. 
Subsection 63-46b-14(2)(a) of the U.A.P.A. does not require 
exhaustion of administrative remedies if the U.A.P.A. or some other 
statute "states that exhaustion is not required." State Farm 
argues the Antidiscriminatory Act can be read to fit within the 
foregoing provision. However, State Farm's argument ignores the 
plain language of the Antidiscriminatory Act. 
Section 34-35-7.1 of the Antidiscriminatory Act establishes a 
comprehensive process for investigation, adjudication and review of 
discrimination claims. Claims of discrimination are filed and 
investigated by U.A.D.D.1 The Division Director then determines 
whether unlawful discrimination has occurred and issues an order 
accordingly.2 
1
 Utah Code Ann. §34-35-7.1(3) (b) . 
2
 Utah Code. Ann. §§34-35-7.1(4) and (5). 
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A party aggrieved by the Director's order may then request an 
evidentiary hearing.3 If no request for evidentiary hearing is 
made, the Director's order becomes final.4 If an evidentiary 
hearing is requested, an ALJ conducts a de novo hearing and issues 
a separate order on the claim of discrimination.5 
At this point, one of two things can occur. The parties may 
simply do nothing, in which case the ALJ's decision becomes the 
final decision of the Commission pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34-35-
7.1(11) (b). Alternatively, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34-35-
7.1(11) (a), a party may file a motion asking the Industrial 
Commission to review the ALJ's order. Such a review, and any 
related reconsideration, is the final administrative remedy 
available under the Antidiscriminatory Act. 
It is at this point that the Antidiscriminatory Act allows 
judicial review, but only of those orders which came before the 
Industrial Commission on a party's motion for review. Subsection 
34-35-7.1 (12) provides: 
An order of the commission under Subsection (11)(a) is 
subject to judicial review as provided in Section 63-46b-
16. 
3
 Utah Code Ann. §§34-35-7.1(4)(c) and (5)(c). 
4
 Utah Code Ann. §§34-35-7.1(4)(d) and (5)(d). 
5
 Utah Code Ann. §§34-35-7.1(8) and (9). 
5 
The critical significance of §34-35-7.1(12) is that it limits 
the availability of judicial review to those cases where the 
parties have taken each step available under the administrative 
process, which is to say, where the parties have exhausted their 
administrative remedies. 
The Court of Appeals itself has pointed out the significance 
of §34-35-7.1(12) of the Antidiscriminatory Act: 
Subsection 12 simply embodies the general principle that 
a party must exhaust its administrative remedies prior to 
obtaining judicial review. Maverik Country Stores v. 
Industrial Commission, 860 P.2d 944, 947 (Utah App. 
1993) . 
State Farm cites the Court of Appeals' decision in Heinecke v. 
Dept. of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459 (Utah App. 1991) for the 
proposition that a party need not exhaust its administrative 
remedies before seeking judicial review. However, in Maverik 
ibid., footnote 5 at page 948, the Court of Appeals cast doubt on 
its decision in Heinecke. Furthermore, Heinecke interpreted the 
requirements of Utah's professional licensing laws, not the Utah 
Antidiscriminatory Act. Even if Utah's professional licensing laws 
do not require exhaustion of administrative remedies, the Utah 
Antidiscriminatory Act does. 
Finally, State Farm argues that because it never requested an 
evidentiary hearing, the Director's orders in both Mena and Jensen 
resulted from "informal" proceedings. State Farm then points to 
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§63-46b-15(1)(a) of the U.A.P.A., which allows district courts to 
review agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative 
proceedings, and claims that §63-46b-15(1)(a) excuses it from 
exhausting its administrative remedies under the Antidiscriminatory 
Act. 
While State Farm's argument is ingenious, it lacks substance. 
Section 63-46b-15(l) (a) of the U.A.P.A., which is the linchpin of 
State Farm's argument, evidences no purpose to override the 
explicit requirement found in §63-46b-14 (2) of the U.A.P.A. that 
parties must exhaust their administrative remedies. If State 
Farm's interpretation of §63-46b-15 (1) (a) were to be accepted, the 
practical effect would allow parties unsuccessful in proceedings 
before UADD to then select the forum where the next level of 
adjudication would occur. Simply by refusing to pursue the 
administrative remedies of the Antidiscriminatory Act, the 
unsuccessful party could transfer the proceeding to the district 
courts. Such a result would undercut the legislative intent, set 
forth in §34-35-7.1(15) of the Utah Antidiscriminatory Act: 
The procedures contained in this section are the 
exclusive remedy under state law for employment 
discrimination. . . 
In summary, §63-46b-14(2) of the U.A.P.A. and §34-35-7.1 of 
the Utah Antidiscriminatory Act require that allegations of 
employment discrimination be adjudicated according to the system 
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created by the legislature in the Utah Antidiscriminatory Act. 
Both the Antidiscriminatory Act and the U.A.P.A. require parties to 
exhaust the administrative remedies available under the 
Antidiscriminatory Act. Because State Farm failed to exhaust its 
administrative remedies, the district courts correctly concluded 
that they lacked jurisdiction to consider State Farm's petitions 
for judicial review. 
POINT TWO 
THE DISTRICT COURTS LACKED JURISDICTION OVER 
STATE FARM'S COMPLAINTS BECAUSE THE COMPLAINTS 
WERE NOT FILED IN TIME. 
The timely filing of a petition for judicial review is 
jurisdictional. Silva v. Department of Employment Security, 786 
P.2d 246, 247 (Utah App. 1990). Section 63-46b-14 (3) (a) of the 
U.A.P.A. allows 30 days to seek judicial review of agency action: 
A party shall file a petition for judicial review of 
final agency action within 3 0 days after the date that 
the order constituting final agency action is issued or 
is considered to be issued under Subsection 63-46b-
13(3)(b). (Emphasis added.) 
The filing period begins to run on the date the decision bears on 
its face. Dusty7 s, Inc. v. Auditing Division, 842 P.2d 868, 870 
(Utah 1992). "Filing" is accomplished by actual delivery to the 
court. Maverik Country Stores v. Industrial Commission, ibid., 
950. 
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Applying the foregoing standards to the facts of the cases now 
before the Court of Appeals, State Farm's petition for review in 
Mena was not filed until 57 days after the Director's order was 
issued. State Farm's petition for review in Jensen was not filed 
until 60 days after the Director's order was issued. Thus, in both 
cases, State Farm failed to file its petitions for review within 
_the 30 days allowed by §63-46b-14 (3) of the U.A.P.A. 
In arguing that its petitions for review were not untimely, 
State Farm attempts to "stack" the 30 day period allowed by §63-
46b-14(3) for filing for judicial review on top of the 30 day 
period allowed by §34-35-7.1(5) of the Antidiscriminatory Act for 
requesting an evidentiary hearing. According to State Farm: 
(Such a result) can be easily harmonized by construing 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-14 (3) (a) to mean that the petition 
for review of final agency action must be filed within 3 0 
days after the order constituting final agency action 
"becomes final." (Emphasis added.) 
The foregoing passage from State Farm's brief indicates a 
recognition by State Farm that it has failed to meet the filing 
deadline of §63-46b-14(3) of the U.A.P.A. State Farm seeks rescue 
from its dilemma by inviting the Court of Appeals to "construe" 
additional language into §63-46b-14(3). The Court of Appeals 
should decline State Farm's invitation and instead apply the plain 
language of the U.A.P.A., including its requirement that petitions 
for judicial review be filed within 30 days. 
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CONCLUSION 
State Farm has created its own predicament. By failing to 
exhaust its administrative remedies under the Antidiscriminatory 
Act, State Farm has precluded judicial review. Likewise, State 
Farm's disregard of administrative procedure has resulted in its 
failure to meet the time periods for filing for judicial review. 
At the risk of straining an analogy, once a locomotive leaves 
the tracks, it may be impossible to get things rolling again. In 
this case, State Farm's train irrevocably left the tracks during 
August 1993, when State Farm failed to request evidentiary hearings 
to challenge the Director's orders. 
The district courts properly concluded they lacked 
jurisdiction to consider State Farm's petitions for judicial review 
due to the fact State Farm had failed to exhaust its administrative 
remedies. In addition to the reason relied upon by the district 
courts, State Farm's petitions for review were also subject to 
dismissal because they were not filed on time. For either reason, 
the district courts' dismissals of State Farm's petitions for 
judicial review should be affirmed. 
Dated this 25th day of January, 1994. 
By 
Alan Hennebold, General Counsel 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
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APPENDIX 1 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act/ §63-46b-14; Judicial review -
Exhaustion of administrative remedies. 
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final 
agency action, except in actions where judicial review is expressly 
prohibited by statute. 
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all 
administrative remedies available, except that: 
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust 
administrative remedies if this chapter or any other statute states 
that exhaustion is not required; 
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of 
the requirement to exhaust any or all administrative remedies if: 
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate*; or 
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable 
harm disproportionate to the public benefit derived from requiring 
exhaustion. 
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of 
final agency action within 3 0 days after the date that the order 
constituting the final agency action is issued or is considered to 
have been issued under Subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b). 
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all other 
appropriate parties as respondents and shall meet the form 
requirements specified in this chapter. 
Utah Antidiscriminatory Act, §34-35-7.1. Procedure for aggrieved 
person to file claim - Investigations - Adjudicative proceedings -
Settlement - Reconsideration - Determination. 
(1) (a) Any person claiming to be aggrieved by a 
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice may by himself, 
his attorney, or his agent, make, sign, and file with the 
commission a request for agency action. 
(b) Every request for agency action shall be verified under 
oath or affirmation. 
(c) A request for agency action made under this section shall 
be filed within 180 days after the alleged discriminatory or 
prohibited employment practice occurred. 
(2) Any employer, labor organization, joint apprenticeship 
committee, or vocational school who has employees or members who 
refuse or threaten to refuse to comply with the provisions of this 
chapter may file with the commission a request for agency action 
asking the commission for assistance to obtain their compliance by 
conciliation or other remedial action. 
(3) (a) Before a hearing is set or held as part of any 
adjudicative proceeding, the commission shall promptly assign an 
investigator to attempt a settlement between the parties by 
conference, conciliation, or persuasion. 
(b) If no settlement is reached, the investigator shall make 
a prompt impartial investigation of all allegations made in the 
request for agency action. 
(c) The commission and its staff, agents, and employees shall 
conduct every investigation in fairness to all parties and agencies 
involved, and may not attempt a settlement between the parties if 
it is clear that no discriminatory or prohibited employment 
practice has occurred. 
(d) If the aggrieved party wishes to withdraw the request for 
agency action, he must do so prior to the issuance of a final 
order. 
(4) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are 
unsuccessful, and the investigator uncovers insufficient evidence 
during his investigation to support the allegations of a 
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice set out in the 
request for agency action, the investigator shall formally report 
these findings to the director. 
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report, the director 
may issue a determination and order for dismissal of the 
adjudicative proceeding. 
(c) A party may make a written request to the director for an 
evidentiary hearing to review de novo the director's determination 
and order within 3 0 days of the date of the determination and order 
for dismissal. 
(d) If the director receives no timely request for a hearing, 
the determination and order issued by the director becomes the 
final order of the commission. 
(5) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are unsuccessful 
and the investigator uncovers sufficient evidence during his 
investigation to support the allegations of a discriminatory or 
prohibited employment practice set out in the request for agency 
action, the investigator shall formally report these findings to 
the director. 
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report the director 
may issue a determination and order based on the investigator's 
report. 
(c) A party may file a written request to the director for an 
evidentiary hearing to review de novo the director's determination 
and order within 3 0 days of the date of the determination and 
order. 
(d) If the director receives no timely request for a hearing, 
the determination and order issued by the director requiring the 
respondent to cease any discriminatory or prohibited employment 
practice and to provide relief to the aggrieved party becomes the 
final order of the commission. 
(6) In any adjudicative proceeding, the investfigator who 
investigated the matter may not participate in a hearing except as 
a witness, nor may he participate in the deliberations of the 
presiding officer. 
(7) Prior to commencement of an evidentiary hearing, the party 
filing the request for agency action may reasonably and fairly 
amend any allegation, and the respondent may amend its answer. 
Those amendments may be made during or after a hearing but only 
with permission of the presiding officer. 
(8) (a) If, upon all the evidence at a hearing, the presiding 
officer finds that a respondent has not engaged in a discriminatory 
or prohibited employment practice, the presiding officer shall 
issue an order dismissing the request for agency action containing 
the allegation of a discriminatory or prohibited employment 
practice. 
(b) The presiding officer may order that the respondent be 
reimbursed by the complaining party for his attorneys' fees and 
costs. 
(9) If upon all the evidence at the hearing, the presiding 
officer finds that a respondent has engaged in a discriminatory or 
prohibited employment practice, the presiding officer shall issue 
an order requiring the respondent to cease any discriminatory or 
prohibited employment practice and to provide relief to the 
complaining party, including reinstatement, back pay and benefits, 
and attorneys' fees and costs. 
(10) Conciliation between the parties is to be urged and 
facilitated at all stages of the adjudicative process. 
(11) (a) Either party may file a written request for review of 
the order issued by the presiding officer in accordance with 
Section 63-46b-12. 
(b) If there is no timely request for review the order issued 
by the presiding officer becomes the final order of the commission. 
(12) An order of the commission under Subsection (11)(a) is 
subject to judicial review as provided in Section 63-46b-16. 
(13) The commission shall have authority to make rules 
concerning procedures under this chapter in accordance with Title 
63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(14) The members of the commission and its staff may not 
divulge or make public any information gained from any 
investigation, settlement negotiation, or proceeding before the 
commission except in the following: 
(a) Information used by the director in making any 
determination may be provided to all interested parties for the 
purpose of preparation for and participation in proceedings before 
the commission. 
(b) General statistical information may be disclosed provided 
the identities of the individuals or parties are not disclosed. 
(c) Information may be disclosed for inspection by the 
attorney general or other legal representatives of the state or 
commission. 
(d) Information may be disclosed for information and 
reporting requirements of the federal government. 
(15) The procedures contained in this section are the 
exclusive remedy under state law for employment discrimination 
based upon race, color, sex, retaliation, pregnancy, childbirth, or 
pregnancy-related conditions, age, religion, national origin, or 
handicap. 
(16) The commencement of an action under federal law for 
relief based upon any act prohibited by this chapter bars the 
commencement or continuation of any adjudicative proceeding before 
the Utah Antidiscrimination Division in connection with the same 
claims under this chapter. Nothing in this subsection is intended 
to alter, amend, modify, or impair the exclusive remedy provision 
set forth in Subsection (15). 
